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THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE
AS APPLIED IN SOUTH CAROLINA
THomAs DEWEy WIsB*
I. INR ODUCTION
It is not necessary to resort to legal terminology to ascertain
the meaning of an emergency. The word itself connotes "a
sudden, generally unexpected occurrence or set of circumstances
demanding immediate action."' Application of this definition
to the law of negligence has resulted in the implied criteria that
in an emergency there must not be time for deliberate discretion
or judgment.2 It should also be noted that the definition of
emergency includes the element of suddenness. In that regard,
perhaps, the common reference to "sudden" emergency is some-
what redundant. On the other hand, the common title aptly
serves to impress upon those who utilize it the most essential
element of the doctrine-that of an unforeseen and unexpected
event.3
The law recognizes that when one is confronted with an emer-
gency situation requiring immediate action, the actor should not
be held to the same standard of care as one who has time to re-
flect upon what he does or does not do.4 Accordingly, a separate
standard, known generally as the sudden emergency doctrine, 5
is used to judge one who acts in the face of an emergency. From
a historical standpoint the doctrine is deeply imbedded in South
Carolina law.6 While the South Carolina Supreme Court has
*A.B., LL.B., University of South Carolina; LL.M., George Washington
University. Associate, Way & Burkett, Charleston, S. C.
1. WEBsT's NnW WORLD DIcTIoNARY OF THE AmE"ICAN LANGUAGE 474
(College ed. 1964).
2. Baker v. Shockey, 92 Ga. App. 443, 88 S.E2d 741, rev'd on other grounds,
212 Ga. 106, 90 S.E.2d 654 (1955). See also 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 17(d)
(1966).
3. See 29A C.J.S. Emergency (1965); 2 D. BLAsHF ., AUTOMOBILE LAv
AND PrucrrcE § 10227 (3d ed. 1965).
4. "In determining whether conduct is negligent toward another, the fact
that the actor is confronted with a sudden emergency which requires rapid
decision is a factor in determining the reasonable character of his choice of
action." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 296 (1965).
5. It is also known as the doctrine of imminent peril, the rule of sudden
peril, or simply as the emergency doctrine. See Gillespie, The Sudden Emerg-
ency Doctrine, 36 Miss. L. J. 392 (1965).
6. The doctrine has its origins in English law. See Jones v. Boyce, 171
Eng. Rep. 540 (N.P. 1816). One of the first reported cases in South Carolina
was Mitchell v. Charleston Light & Power Co., 45 S.C. 146, 160, 22 S.E. 767,
772 (1895) in which the court spoke in terms of a "situation of peril."
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never delineated the criteria of the sudden emergency doctrine,
a practical application envisons these six elements: (1) an emer-
gency must have actually or apparently (from the standpoint of
the one asserting the doctrine) existed; (2) the emergency must
not have been reasonably anticipated; (3) the emergency must
not have arisen from the actor's own negligent conduct; (4) the
actor must have been faced with deciding between two or more
courses of action; (5) there must not have existed time for
reflective judgment upon which course to follow; (6) once the
emergency was perceived the actor must have exercised such care
as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the
same circumstances.
II. ELEMENTs OF T SuDDEN EmERGENoY DocTRu
ActuaZ or Apparent Emistence of an Emergency. The basic
premise of the doctrine is that an emergency actually or ap-
parently exists. If there has been no showing of an emergency
situation, the trial judge should refuse an instruction regarding
the doctrine.7 The question becomes more complex when evi-
dence of an emergency is in dispute. Generally, when there is
evidence of an emergency, the question should be submitted with
proper instructions to the jury." On the other hand, when the
evidence is undisputed that an emergency did exist, it is proper
for the court to so hold as a matter of law.9
South Carolina courts have placed a reasonable interpretation
on what constitutes an emergency. For example, emergencies
were found to exist when a child on a coaster wagon suddenly
entered the highway from behind an embankment,' when the
brakes of an automobile failed and it collided with a tree," and
when a child riding a bicycle fell beneath the wheels of a moving
bus.12  On the other hand, the court held that an emergency
did not exist when an employer directed his employee to operate
7. Hice v. Dobson Lumber Co., 180 S.C. 259, 185 S.E. 742 (1936) in which
there was no showing of "pressing necessity."
8. Shockey v. Baker, 212 Ga. 106, 90 SXE2d 654 (1955); McVey v.
Whittington, 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E2d 92 (1966); Southern Passenger Motor
Lines v. Burks, 187 Va. 53, 46 S.E2d 26 (1928).
9. O'Kelly v. Barhes, 223 N.C. 282, 25 S.E.2d 750 (1943) ; Elrod v. All,
243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410 (1964); Watson v. Aiken, 243 S.C. 368, 133
S.E.2d 833 (1963) ; Porter v. Cook, 196 S.C. 433, 13 S.E.2d 486 (1940).
10. Watson v. Aiken, 243 S.C. 368, 133 S.E2d 833 (1963).
11. Grier v. Cornelius, 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E2d 338 (1966).
12. Porter v. Cook, 196 S.C. 433, 13 S.E2d 486 (1940).
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a ripsaw in an unsafe manner to fill an order for wood carved
in a certain form. 8
It should be noted that on at least one occasion, an opposing
party has judicially conceded the existence of an emergency.
In Elrod v. AZZ' 4 the plaintiff guest brought an action against
defendant host for injuries arising out of an automobile accident
in which the defendant collided with a tree in an effort to avoid
striking a third party. The plaintiff set forth in her pleadings
that the defendant was faced with an emergency when a third
party drove into the defendant's lane of travel. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court unanimously held that the plaintiff was
bound by allegations in her pleadings and, finding no actionable
negligence, reversed in favor of the defendant. The clear lesson to
be learned from Elrod, is that care should be taken not to con-
cede the existence of any element of the doctrine when defending
against it.
The Emergency Must Not Have Been Reasonably Anticipated.
It could well be argued that if an emergency were anticipated,
it would cease to be an emergency. 15 Nevertheless, when one
engages in an activity in which certain emergencies are likely
to arise, he must be prepared to meet them.16
Problems in this regard arise most commonly when children
suddenly attempt to cross a highway, oblivous to oncoming
traffic. South Carolina has followed the salutary rule that a
motorist is not liable for injuries received by a child who enters
a highway so abruptly that the motorist has no time to stop or
swerve from his path.' 7 But one recent case casts doubt upon
the blanket application of this rule.
13. Hice v. Dobson Lumber Co., 180 S.C. 259, 185 S.E. 742 (1936).
14. 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410 (1964).
15. Sowizral v. Hughes, 333 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1964). See also Weaks v.
South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 159 S.E.2d 234 (S.C. 1968) in which
the trial judge's ruling excluding evidence which sought to duplicate the acci-
dent, but did not take into account "emergency conditions" was upheld.
16. Kuist v. Curran, 116 Cal. App. 2d 404, 253 P.2d 681 (1953) ; Baltimore
Transit Co. v. Prinz, 215 Md. 398, 137 A.2d 700 (1958) (slowing down of car
traveling in middle lane of multiple lane highway); 2 F. HARa & F. JAmES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.12, at 940 (1956); W. PRossm, HADBooK, OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 33 (3d ed. 1964).
17. Watson v. Aiken, 243 S.C. 368, 133 S.E.2d 833 (1963); Gunnels v.
Roach, 243 S.C. 248, 133 S.E2d 757 (1963); Williams v. Clinton, 236 S.C.
373, 114 S.E2d 490 (1960); Critzer v. Kerlin, 231 S.C. 315, 98 S.E2d 761
(1957); Porter v. Cook, 196 S.C. 433, 18 S.E.2d 486 (1940); see 2A D.
BLASHFIELD, CYCLoPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRAcTicE § 1498 (Perm.
ed. 1951); 7 Am. JuR. 2d AUTOMOBILES & HIGHWAY TRAmc § 450 (1963);
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396(b) (1949).
[Vol. 20
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In Herring v. Boyd, I8 the defendant's automobile struck the
deceased, a four year old child, when the child suddenly entered
the roadway from behind a parked car. The defendant was
driving well under the thirty-five miles per hour speed limit,
which was posted with the warning, "Children Playing." There
was some evidence of defective brakes on the defendant's auto-
mobile. Nevertheless, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in
affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, said that
where the driver of a vehicle knows, or should know, that
children may reasonably be expected to be in, near, or ad-
jacent to the street or highway, he is under a duty to anti-
cipate the likelihood of their running into or across the
roadway in obedience to childish impulses, and to exercise
due care under the circumstances for their safety.19
Whether by sympathy for the plaintiff or design in modify-
ing the general rule, the court has placed the element of antici-
pation into the emergency doctrine as applied in South Caro-
lina. The extent to which the element will be considered as con-
trolling in the future is a matter of conjecture. However, it is
safe to conclude that reasonable anticipation of an emergency
situation will ultimately be raised by an opposing party to pre-
vent the application of the sudden emergency doctrine.
Emergency Must Not Arise from Actor's own Negligent Con-
duct. This element carries one step further the rationale of the
previously discussed element of anticipation of the emergency.
In the element of anticipation of an emergency, there is no
tortious conduct on the part of the actor such as speeding,20 driv-
ing with defective brakes,21 following too closely,22 or refusing
to yield the right of way.23 Thus, application of the sudden
emergency doctrine does not lower the standard of care due
others prior to the emergency's arising.
24
18. 245 S.C. 284, 140 S.E2d 246 (1965).
19. Id. at 290, 140 S.E.2d at 249. See also Barton v. Griffith, 253 F. Supp.
774 (D.S.C. 1966).
20. Brunson v. Gainey, 245 N.C. 152, 95 S.E2d 514 (1956).
21. See Grier v. Cornelius, 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E2d 338 (1966) in which
plaintiff alleged that defendant operated a motor vehicle which had defective
brakes.
22. Miller v. Cody, 41 Wash. 2d 775, 252 P.2d 303 (1953).
23. Tyson v. Shoemaker, 83 Ga. App. 33, 62 S.E2d 586 (1950).
24. Dobbins v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 108 S.C. 254, 93 S.E. 932 (1917).
See aho Becker v. Hasebroock, 157 Neb. 353, 59 N.W.2d 560 (1953) ; Sarnak
v. Cehula, 393 Pa. 5, 142 A.2d 204 (1958).
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss3/2
SouTH CAnOLIwA LAW REvIW
The general rule is that one cannot avail himself of the sudden
emergency doctrine if the emergency was created by one's own
tortious conduct. 25 The South Carolina courts have uniformly
followed this reasoning. Thus, in Grier v. Corneius, 26 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that it was proper for the trial
judge to instruct the jury both on the law that violation of the
brake statute2 7 was negligence per se and on the sudden emer-
gency doctrine. There the plaintiff was a passenger in an
automobile operated by the defendant. The brakes failed, and
the plaintiff was injured in a subsequent collision with a tree.
Acknowledging that the jury could have determined that the
brake statute had not been violated prior to the sudden failure
of the brakes, the court approved of the instructions to the jury.
The trial judge had prefaced his instruction on sudden emer-
gency with instructions that the emergency must not have been
brought about by the negligence of the one claiming the "sud-
den emergency."
The Actor Must Be Faced with Deciding Between Two or
More Courses of Action. The sudden emergency doctrine presup-
poses a mistake of judgment in the face of pressing necessity. The
doctrine will isolate one from liability for not making the wisest
choice as long as the choice made was that which a reasonably
prudent person would have made under the same or similar
circumstances.28 Thus, this element begins with the assumption
that the actor is aware of the emergency situation. Clearly, one
not aware of an emergency situation would not be faced with
choices of action. Likewise, when there is no choice of action,
the sudden emergency doctrine is not a proper defense.29
25. Fetzer v. Rampley, 81 Ga. App. 806, 60 S.E.2d 757 (1945); Boykin v.
Bissette, 260 N.C. 295, 132 S.E.2d 616 (1963) ; Connelly v. Southern Ry., 249
S.C. 363, 154 S.E.2d 569 (1967); Dobbins v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 108
S.C. 254, 93 S.E. 932 (1917); Douglass v. Southern Ry., 82 S.C. 71, 62 S.E.
15 (1908) ; Braxton v. Flippo, 183 Va. 839, 33 S.E2d 757 (1945).
26. 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E2d 338 (1966).
27. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-561, et seq. (safe braking mechanisms on
motor vehicles).
28. Forgy v. Schwartz, 262 N.C. 185, 136 S.E2d 668 (1964); Schlose v.
Hallman, 255 N.C. 686, 122 S.E2d 513 (1961); Porter v. Cook, 196 S.C.
433, 13 S.E.2d 486 (1940) ; Barkshadt v. Grisham, 120 S.C. 219, 112 S.E. 923
(1922); Douglass v. Southern Ry., 82 S.C. 71, 62 S.E. 15 (1908); Mitchell
v. Charleston Light & Power Co., 45 S.C. 146, 22 S.E. 767 (1895).
29. See Southern v. Cudahy Packing Co., 160 S.C. 496, 159 S.E. 32 (1931)
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There Must Not Exist Time for Reflective Judgment. The
sudden emergency doctrine is not applicable to one who, when
confronted with an emergency, has the opportunity to reflect
upon a course of conduct to follow.80 If the opportunity to re-
flect upon alternatives is present, the actor should be judged in
the light of ordinary circumstances. South Carolina courts have
followed this general rule.3 1
Normally, whether there is an opportunity to reflect is a
question of fact for the jury to decide. The South Carolina Court
recognized as much in Melton v. Ritch. 32 There the plaintiff
sought to recover damages for injuries received in a collision
with the defendant's automobile when the defendant was at-
tempting to avoid a collision with a third party. The trial
judge ruled as a matter of law that the defendant was con-
fronted with a sudden emergency when faced with the third
party vehicle approaching his automobile from the opposite
direction on the wrong side of the road. The defendant veered
to the left and collided with a truck driven by the plaintiff.
There was testimony that a passenger in the defendant's vehicle
perceived the danger and warned the defendant several times
to alter his course and pull onto the right shoulder of the high-
way. In reversing the case, the state supreme court concluded
that it was a question for the jury whether the defendant should
not have recognized the danger earlier. Impliedly, the decision
questioned whether the defendant did not have the opportunity
to reflect upon available choices of action in the emergency con-
fronting him. Recent South Carolina cases have followed this
reasoning, holding that the emergency must compel the actor to
react "instantly."3
Due Care Must Have Been Exercised Once the Emergency Is
Perceived. Once the emergency is perceived the actions of the
one placed in an emergency are not free of scrutiny. Therefore,
he cannot act recklessly or unreasonably in attempting to avert
30. Brock v. Avery Co., 99 Ga. App. 881, 110 S.E2d 122 (1959); Stripling
v. Calhoun, 98 Ga. App. 354, 105 S.E2d 923 (1958) (opportunity for "mature
reflection" considered).
31. E.g., Melton v. Ritch, 231 S.C. 146, 97 S.E.2d 509 (1957), which is
the next case to be discussed.
32. Id.
33. McVey v. WWttington, 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E.2d 92 (1966).
6
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the emergency and the emergency doctrine will not protect him
if he does.
3 4
The law is clear that the existence of an emergency is merely
one facet of the light in which the actor's conduct is judged.
Other courts speak in terms of a lower standard of care in an
emergency,85 but in South Carolina the test remains one of what
"a man of reasonable prudence would do under the circum-
stances.
38
Likewise, acts in an emergency are not to be judged by hind-
sight, but rather by what knowledge the actor possessed at the
time of the emergency.37 Justice Cardozo succinctly expressed
this concept prior to his elevation to the United States Supreme
Court:
Errors of judgment, however, would not count against him,
if they resulted from the excitement and confusion of the
moment. The reason that was exacted of him was not the
reason of the morrow. It was reason fitted and proportional
to the time and the event.38
Assuming that the wisest choice was not made by the actor,
he will not be held liable so long as he meets the "prudent man"
test. Here the question turns to whether the choice made was so
hazardous that the ordinarily prudent man would not have made
it under similar circumstances.
In Porter v. C'ook, 39 the question was whether the driver of a
bus acted unreasonably in not slackening his speed when an
eleven-year-old boy on a bicycle crashed into the side of the bus.
In affirming a nonsuit in favor of the defendant, the supreme
court said:
34. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co. v. O'Neill, 175 Md. 47,
200 A. 359 (1938). But see Douglass v. Southern Ry., 82 S.C. 71, 62 S.E.
15 (1908) which casts doubt on this general statement by approving use of
whatever means were "apparently necessary" for the plaintiff to extricate
himself from an emergency situation.
35. Goolsbee v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 150 Tex. 528, 243 S.W2d 386 (1951).
36. Young v. Livingston, 247 S.C. 385, 147 S.E.2d 624 (1966); Elrod v.
All, 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E2d 410 (1964); Porter v. Cook, 196 S.C. 433,
13 S.E2d 486 (1950).
37. See generally James, The Qualities of a Reasonable Man in Negligence
Cases, 16 Mo. L. Rav. 1 (1951).
38. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 177, 133 N.E. 437, 438
(1921).
39. 196 S.C. 433, 13 S.E.2d 486 (1940).
[Vol. 20
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[S]peculate and theorize as we may as to what course of con-
duct might have been wisest and safest for the defendant,
Cook, to have followed in order to avoid doing injury to
the boy, the fact remains that if this case had been sub-
mitted to the jury it would have left the issue of negligence
wholly dependent upon the doctrine of chance and not upon
actual proof.
40
One case which required no speculation is Helton v. Ritko.
41
There the defendant's passenger several times pointed out an
alternate course to the defendant in order to avoid a collision
with approaching vehicles. Reversing a directed verdict for the
defendant, the supreme court noted that "the question of whether
such a person exercised due care under the circumstances is or-
dinarily one of fact for the jury."42 Were it not for the fact that
the defendant's passenger disagreed with his choice of action, the
rationale of Porter would have been controlling. Instead, this
was an unusual case in which two persons faced the same emer-
gency and differed in choices of action. Quite properly, it was
left to the jury to resolve the question of reasonableness.
III. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
An instruction covering the doctrine of sudden emergency
should not be given when the issue is not reasonably raised.43
The issue can be raised by concession in the opposing party's
pleadings,44 by direct evidence presented at trial,45 or by circum-
stantial evidence.46 Once raised, the issue must be instructed
upon and submitted to the jury if more than one reasonable in-
ference can be drawn from the evidence. 47 However, if the
trial judge determines in light of all the evidence that there is
40. Id. at 437, 13 S.E.2d at 488.
41. 231 S.C. 146, 97 S.E2d 509 (1957).
42. Id. at 152, 97 S.E2d at 513.
43. Hice v. Dobson Lumber Co., 180 S.C. 259, 185 S.E. 742 (1936).
44. Elrod v. All, 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E2d 410 (1964).
45. McVey v. Whittington, 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E2d 92 (1966); Grier v.
Cornelius, 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 338 (1966); Young v. Livingston, 247
S.C. 385, 147 S.E2d 624 (1966); Green v. Sparks, 232 S.C. 414, 102 S.E.2d
435 (1958) ; Melton v. Ritch, 231 S.C. 146, 97 S.E2d 509 (1957).
46. Brogdon v. Northwestern R.R., 141 S.C. 238, 139 S.E. 459 (1927).
47. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Eddins, 177 F2d 954 (4th Cir. 1949); Mc-
Vey v. Whittington, 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E2d 92 (1966); Ray v. Simon, 245
S.C. 577, 140 S.E2d 575 (1965); Wynn v. Rood, 228 S.C. 577, 91 S.E.2d
276 (1956).
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no other reasonable inference but that the actor was confronted
with a sudden emergency and exercised due care in meeting it,
he should grant a directed verdict in favor of the party assert-
ing the emergency doctrine.48
Surprisingly, South Carolina courts have been silent on the
question of whether the trial judge must, under appropriate
circumstances, define for the jury the concept of "sudden emer-
gency." Some jurisdictions hold that it is error not to define
sudden emergency adequately for the benefit of the jury.4 9 It is
submitted that a strong argument could be advanced in support
of the proposition that the South Carolina trial judge should be
required to define sudden emergency as part of their instruction
of the jury.50
A general definition of sudden emergency and one acceptable
in the context of South Carolina judicial decisions is at follows:
I charge you that a sudden emergency is a sudden and un-
expected event or combination of circumstances which calls
for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate
exercise of judgment or discretion, and which could not
have been foreseen by a reasonably prudent man under the
same or similar circumstances.51
Naturally, any definition of sudden emergency should be
tailored to the factual conditions existing in each case.52 The
trial judge should likewise relate the instruction to the theories
advanced by either side.53
48. Elrod v. All, 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E2d 410 (1964).
49. Gulf M. & O.R.R. v. Withers, 247 Miss. 123, 154 So. 2d 157 (1963)
in which the court held that an adequate instruction must define and describe
the sudden emergency, stating the facts which a jury might decide warranted
a finding of sudden emergency.
50. But see Hutchinson v. City of Florence, 189 S.C. 123, 200 S.E. 73
(1939) which held it was not error not to define "contributory negligence."
Other cases would seem to require definitions, especially if requested. Kirven
v. Kirven, 162 S.C. 162, 160 S.E. 432 (1931) ; Nohrden v. Northeastern R.R.,
59 S.C. 87, 37 S.E. 228 (1900).
51. See Gillespie, The Sudden Emergency Doctrine, 36 Miss. L. J. 406
(1965). See also 2 D. BLAsHXE=, AUTOMonILE LAW AND PRACECa § 10226
n.67 (3d ed. 1965).
52. See Annot, 80 A.L.R2d 5 (1961).
53. Ramer v. Hughes, 131 S.C. 490, 127 S.E. 565 (1925) in which the court
held that an instruction was not fatally defective for failure to include, as a
condition of its applicability, the fact that the emergency must have been caused
by the act of the party invoking the rule, in view of a preceding instruction.
[Vol. 20
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When confronted with a situation in which the emergency
doctrine is asserted as a defense to primary negligence, the fol-
lowing instruction should be requested:
I charge you that if you find that the defendant was con-
fronted with a sudden emergency brought about by the
negligence of another and not by his own negligence and
he is compelled to act instantly to avoid injury to himself
and/or those to whom he owes a duty of care, he is not
guilty of negligence if he makes such a choice as a person
of ordinary prudence placed in such a position might make,
even though he did not make the wisest choice.5"
An approved instruction in a case in which the emergency
doctrine is asserted as a bar to contributory negligence is as
follows:
Now, I charge you that on the question of contributory
negligence, if you believe from the evidence that the plain-
tiff was confronted with a sudden peril not arising from his
own fault, then he may act in the manner which the emer-
gency seems to require for the purpose of avoiding injury to
himself without being guilty of contributory negligence,
provided he acted as one of his age and of his capacity, dis-
cretion, knowledge and experience would ordinarily have
acted under the same or similar circumstances. 55
IV. CoNCLusION
It is evident that the sudden emergency doctrine is a useful
legal weapon in the arsenal of the South Carolina negligence
practitioner. Given appropriate factual situations, the doctrine
can be utilized by either the plaintiff or defendant. Its dual
usage may be likened to a two-edged sword, warning those who
unsheath it to be proficient in its use. Proficiency would require
that one seeking the use of the doctrine plead it affirmatively,
while one defending against the doctrine take care not to con-
cede the existence of an emergency in pretrial pleadings. Efforts
at trial should be in the direction of minimizing or eliminating
54. Weaks v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 159 S.E.2d 234 (S.C.
1968) ; Porter v. Cook, 196 S.C. 433, 13 S.E.2d 486 (1940); cited udith ap-
proval in Elrod v. All, 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E2d 410 (1964); McVey v.
Whittington, 248 S.C. 447, 151 S.E.2d 92 (1966).
55. Young v. Livingston, 247 S.C. 385, 147 S.E2d 624 (1966).
10
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the following: (1) any contention that an emergency did not
exist; (2) any contention that the emergency was the result of
a client's negligence; (3) any arguable alternative that there
was time for reflective judgment; (4) any contention that
the client, once the emergency was perceived, did not exercise
such care as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised
under the same circumstances.
11
Wise: The Sudden Emergency Doctrine as Applied in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
